The Problems Of Publishing In English In free essay sample

Egypt Essay, Research Paper An Overview of the jobs of Printing in English in Egypt A study by Ib Knutsen. Supervised by Dr. Hussein Amin. Course 504.Ib @ aucegypt.eduhttp: //ibsweb.findhere.com Contents Introduction 3 Presentation of Method 3 List of intreviews 4 Discussion of Method 5 Presentation of Results.. 6 Printing 6 Censorship 8 Summary of the different attacks to censorship 9 # 8211 ; Al Ahram 9 # 8211 ; The Middle East Times 10 # 8211 ; The Cairo Times 11 Culture 11 # 8211 ; Language 12 # 8211 ; Reading Patterns 13 Discussion. 14 Decision 15 Appendices.. 16 # 8211 ; Interview with Middle East Times 16 # 8211 ; Interview with Egypt s Insight 18 # 8211 ; Interview with the Al-Ahram Weekly 19 # 8211 ; Interview with Cairo Times 21 # 8211 ; Letter from Exile, Thomas Cromwell 23 # 8211 ; Interview with the censor, by MET 24 IntroductionEnglish publication in Egypt is non extended. Merely eight magazines and newspapers come out on a regular footing. Merely a minority of the Egyptian population k nows the English linguistic communication and half the population is illiterate. Yet these are non the largest jobs confronting the English speech production imperativeness. Social, economical and political issues are closely intertwined in Egypt. Magazines or intelligence publications face extra obstructions seeking to cover these subjects. How do the different editors approach or overcome these jobs? My research inquiry is An Overview of the Problems of Publishing in English in Egypt. There is no province censoring of Egyptian publications. Is the right of freedom of look therefore secured in Egypt? In order to examine these inquiries I went to the different English speech production publications and talked with their several editors. I told them what I was working on, and tried to do the editors comment on their state of affairs in their ain words. There are several dimensions to printing in English in Egypt. The linguistic communication barrier, the Egyptian imperativeness license, Matters of national security and usage are but some. I asked the editors explicitly to give an appraisal on the significance of these, if they had non already done so. I talked with Al-Ahram, Hani Shukrallah, Pull offing EditorThe Cairo Times, Ms Diana Digges, EditorThe Cairo Times, Mr Hisham Kassem, PublisherThe Middle East Times, Mr Rod Craig, Managing Editor Egypt s Insight, Ms Nahed Yowakim, Editor-in-ChiefEgypt Today, Mr Scott Squire, Copy EditorI wrote their remarks down in stenography. If there were remarks I was unsure of, I asked once more. I spent about 40 proceedingss with each editor. When each interview was done, I spent an extra 15 proceedingss composing down a sum-up of the contents. I besides filled out the losing parts of the stenography text. I did my first interview with the editor of the Cairo times, Ms Diana Digges. She had prepared a figure of CT issues incorporating articles on the subject. These were most helpful in chalk outing out the field. I used this information as background for my following interviews with Egypt Today, The Middle East Times, The Al-Ahram, Egypt s insight and eventually, Cairo Times once more. This clip with the publishing house, Mr Hisham Kassem. In add-on, The interview wit h Egypt Today was brief, but consistent with the other findings. I found an interview with Mr Lutfi Abdel Kader, who heads the commission for foreign publications in Egypt, and an unfastened missive from Mr Thomas Cromwell, editor in expatriate for the Middle East Times. Both of these secondary beginnings were posted on the cyberspace with the permission of the Middle East Times. The MET besides have a nexus to the digital freedom web on their home page. I failed to acquire in touch with the staying regular publication, The Egyptian Gazette. As with the Al-Ahram, the EG is besides a authorities paper. It is, nevertheless, non considered a important publication in Egypt. The Al-Ahram s pull offing editor, Hani Shukrallah, thought it valueless to be better than the EG. He commented further that We fundamentally see what they do and seek non to make the same. When editor-in-chief Ms. Nahed Yowakim of Egypt s Insight studies what is allowed to print in Egypt, she does non look in the EG , she looks in the Al-Ahram. Discussion of MethodI accounted a figure of troubles while roll uping the information. First of all were the job of communicating. Though The Egyptian Gazette and the Al-Ahram by far were the most hard to acquire in touch with, Egypt Today, Egypt s Insight and the Middle East Times were besides clip devouring. This was non merely due to busy lines, as was the instance with the authorities documents, but instead the busy docket of the editors. They often travel, have meetings or merely are out. As a consequence, the information assemblage took much more clip than anticipated. It must be added that every bit shortly as I did pull off to acquire through to the right individual, they were really forthcoming in puting an assignment every bit shortly as possible. They besides showed considerable involvement in the undertaking, and were really helpful to give positions on the subject. As I mentioned, I had problem to the extent of non pull offing to acquire in touch with the Egyptian Gazette. I was besides unable to acquire in touch with Egypt Today s publishing house, Ms Anne Marie Harrison or the editor Mursi Saad el-Din. I did correspond with the publication over legion Electronic mails, and with their transcript editor, Mr Scott Squire, over the telephone. He confirmed the major points, but I have non presented Egypt Today s positions individually in the paper, due to my inability to acquire in touch with the editor or the publishing house. I do non believe that this significantly alters the cogency of the paper. I did talk with a bulk of the publications. I spoke with all the private news-weeklies, the major authorities hebdomadally and one of the two lifestyle magazines published monthly. The responses were really similar. The English publications in Egypt face the same jobs. Their attack varies somewhat. I have no ground to believe that Egypt Today or the Egyptian Gazette usage a significantly different attack than the other media. I think the dependability therefore is high. Presentation of resultsThe jobs of printing in English in Egypt can be divided into three subdivisions ; The job of publication, the job of censoring and the job of civilization. I will discourse each subdivision individually. The publication subdivision regards the industry. I have hence included the responses by the different editors in the description, instead than as separate subdivisions. In the censoring subdivision, there are discrepancies among the different publications. I have hence separated it in two, showing the general construct of censoring first and the specifics of each publication last. When it comes to civilization, the responses were rather similar, so I have grouped them under the different cultural sub-headings as I thought it appropriate. PublishingThe Freezone for concern was set up in the satellite metropolis of Cairo, Nasser metropolis, to advance the development of endeavor. Business could register with the min istry of inside to acquire a license to run in the zone. In order to get down a publication company, an extra set of standards had to be met. This was due to the national security facet of publication. The standard for registering as a publication house used to be 200 stockholders with equal portions. This made it practically impossible to achieve the license. Merely one publication in Egypt managed to register harmonizing to these standards. This is an Arabic publication, and the proprietor has the power of lawyer over all the other portions in the company. This indicates that the staying 199 stockholders are alleged straw work forces, registered as proprietors simply for legal grounds. In 1996, this jurisprudence was revised. Now merely 10 stockholders were necessary, but blessing of the province security and the national security was necessary. You need to be more than good friends with these to acquire your blessing, harmonizing to Mr Hishan Kissem, Three Arabic publications wer e approved, but no English 1s. Entreaties can be brought before the higher imperativeness council. If they refuse, nevertheless, one must use once more. This procedure have been farther limited by a new jurisprudence demanding a Cabinet permission for all applications. Their determination is concluding, and can non be appealed. This efficaciously bars publications considered unwanted by the authorities to print in Egypt. The English publications in Egypt are based in Egypt. Their offices are in Cairo, their journalists live in here, as do their readers. The companies who advertise in the publications are registered in Egypt. Yet the publications are considered foreign. Of the English speech production imperativeness in Egypt, merely the governmental Al-Ahram and the Egyptian Gazette have Egyptian publication licenses. The authorities is loath to put an straight-out prohibition on publications in Egypt. This gives the publications the chance to publish in another state and export the publication from at that place to Egypt. The most usual topographic point to registry is in Cyprus, and the name for Egyptian publications both Arabic and English printed outside Egypt has come to be called the Cyprus imperativeness # 8211 ; irrespective whether it is published at that place or non. The fiscal state of affairs for the Cyprus imperativeness is really unstable. They are virtually unable to acquire bank loans, as they are non registered as a company in Egypt. Selling equity portions is for the same grounds impossible. The foreign publications are non allowed to publicize on broadcast telecasting, which inhibits publicity on the most powerful media channel. Economic growing, which is indispensable for any company, is badly limited. All companies outside the Freezone have to pay revenue enhancement, including the Cyprus imperativeness. The Al-Ahram is printed in the freezone. The largest load is presently the general advertisement revenue enhancement of 36 % . Income g enerated by advertisement is a major subscriber to the balance of publishing houses. Adding a 3rd to the monetary value of ads make them about impossible to sell. Alternatively, one can allow the publication cover the disbursal, with the resulting loss of income. Most of the English publishing houses have managed to avoid the advertisement revenue enhancement by paying the import responsibility on published stuff. This revenue enhancement is between 7 10 % on publication cost, i.e. a significantly smaller sum. They argue you can non pay domestic revenue enhancement and import responsibility at the same clip. The authorities remains open, and will possibly merely come to a decision when they want to take an unwanted publishing house. CensorshipConcerning all publications in Egypt are the Libel Torahs. These were introduced in 1993, and are described by Mr Shukrallah as absurd. It is the public prosecuting officer who is responsible for pressing charges. Charges are merely being press ed if you attack the incorrect people Simple statements as stupidity, can gain 6 months in gaol whereas people who merely defame can merely maintain on traveling with their Interior Ministry backup. Without a publication license, the intelligence publications are in add-on apt to censorship. National security concerns are at interest. It is the ministry of information that is the highest authorization on imperativeness affairs. They authorise a council to take attention of the foreign imperativeness. Each publication must demo the publication upon reaching in Egypt to this council. This is a hazardous concern. If the council do non O.K. of the content, they have the power of censoring the issue. A prohibition represents a considerate loss if the publication has already gone to publish. Agreements are being made with the censors. Blueprints of the publication are shown before it is printed, and if there are troublesome articles underway, these are shown excessively. The censors so ta ke what they think necessary. The censors are on a mission from the Information Ministry. They are under force per unit area. If they allow controversial stuff to acquire published, it is they who will hold to take the heat for it. From the censor s position so, it will be better to take out every bit much as possible. The editors know this. They bargain with the detectors, rewrite articles and refer to the Al-Ahram. Though all the foreign imperativeness is affected by censoring, it is the intelligence publications that are hit the worst. Shorter deadlines pressure them to move fast on events, Egypt s Insight, Egypt Today, Business Today and PC universe are published on a monthly footing. They can take into history the developments of the other publications when they decide what to print. Ms Nahed Yowakim of Egypt s Insight really considers being a monthly an advantage, as they can take the clip to wait until Al-Ahram covers a peculiar intelligence narrative ( gain their error ) If they have covered a subject, it is regarded as common cognition. Egypt s Insight can so make a full characteristic on it even from another angle and refer to the Al-Ahram coverage of the same subject. Summary of the different attacks to censorship The Al-AhramThe Al-Ahram is the oldest and largest authorities paper in Egypt. They publish an Arabic daily and an English weekly. The Al-Ahram is non censored. They want to print serious news media, respect authorities position, while avoid being seen as a propaganda sheet for the authorities. So they adhere to some limitations. They are left mostly alone if certain ruddy lines are non overstepped, The major subject to go forth entirely is the nexus between large concern and authorities. And unfavorable judgment of the president, of class. But the Al-Ahram by and large does non knock members of the authorities. They do non delve up information about authorities functionaries either. It would be interesting, of class, but since everybody i s making concern with everybody, it is better to go forth it. But, if other documents have found something out and printed it, the Al-Ahram refer both sides of the narrative, being careful to province who says what. If the regulations are broken, the editor will merely be transferred. It is non unusual to be transferred to the information ministry. Or to a correspondence occupation in Luxor, to mention Mr Craig. The Al-Ahram is the most influential paper in Egypt. The Al-Ahram is considered to being able to acquire away with a batch more than the English speech production imperativeness in general. Egypt s insight usage illustrations from the Al-Ahram when they argue with the censors for an article. If something has been published in the Al-Ahram, the detectors can legalize to their supervisors why they let something through. The Middle East TimesMr Thomas Cromwell of the Middle East Times has been refused re-entry into Egypt after a trip abroad. He has written an essay included in the extension of this paper. I talked to the pull offing editor, Mr Rod Craig. The MET shows the cogent evidence of the publication to the censors. In return they take out paragraphs instead than articles. He describes the relationship with the censors as good. They have statements with the censors, where they take part on an equal footing. Sometimes they win through with an article, and sometimes they lose. They have developed an apprehension of what can be published. Sing a peculiar article that was banned, he commented We were forcing it truly. Criticism of the president is out of the inquiry. Government functionaries vary, and even Mubarak has commented that The promises made by some of my curates are about every bit dependable as those made by Netanyahu Criticism of the Military, Saudi Arabia and the Copts are to be dealt with extreme attention. Saudi Arabia is a considerable investor in Egypt. Upon unfavorable judgment, they have besides threatened to throw out the 100s of 100 0s of Egyptians that they employ. The recent statute law in the US against spiritual persecution makes the Coptic issue even more sensitive. Yet, Mr Craig gets the feeling that most governments are corrupt, and that the censoring is to forestall the denudation of this The MET s point of view is that a good journalist can print anything. It is hence a affair of sophisticated look to avoid holding statements and paragraphs removed. Though a more blunt manner of stating the truth, Mr Craig has assurance in his readers to set two and two together The purpose of the Middle East Times is non to be censored though we do acquire a batch of attending when we do. The purpose of the MET is to inform the populace in an nonsubjective manner, and traveling where the information takes ( us ) . The Cairo TimesThe Cairo Times have been banned six times this twelvemonth. They are in a changeless struggle with the detectors. The detectors contact the Ministry of Information when they are in uncertaint y. It is the Ministry of Information that Cairo Times truly have a job with. The censoring frequently comes as a consequence of neglecting to demo all the articles to the censors. When the newsmagazine is on the streets, it is frequently excessively late to censor it. As a consequence, the undermentioned issue is banned as a warning. Mr Hisham Kissem regards his publication as being figure one one the authorities s most wanted list of publications to shut down. Yet Mr Kissem thinks the jobs of printing in general in Egypt are most at hand. As for free address, Mr Kissem Bankss on Globalisation CultureCultural jobs arise when garnering information. These jobs include the linguistic communication barrier. Cultural jobs can besides include the motive of authorities employees to talk out. It will rarely be honoring for them to make so, and will sometimes take to problem. In add-on, there is a cultural difference between Arabs and Westerners in respect to information. This is perceived t o be due to the differences in educational system and the Arabic civilization in general. There is a general intuition towards people who ask inquiries in Egypt. In authorities, this is even more so. Answering inquiries will seldom bring wagess, though it might convey jobs for the person. When the people who ask inquiries are non Egyptians, there seems to be an even stronger ground to be careful. All the English speech production publications face these jobs. Even the governmental Al-Ahram # 8211 ; though Mr Shukrallah observes that transporting the name Al-Ahram do do it a batch easier for our journalists. Mr Shukrallah thinks the Al-Ahram s focal point with Egyptian eyes, sometimes may look odd to the alien. Mr Craig has noted this difference every bit good. Egyptian journalists are witting of Egypt s repute, and this may impact their information assemblage, he says. On the other manus, Egyptian journalists might see beyond this, and gain the positive facets of transparence. They might therefore go the strongest nexus we have, Mr Craig continues. Egyptian journalists face harsher intervention from the authorities. As a consequence, they sometimes request holding their name withheld upon being published. This is non an unusual pattern in any of the publications, once more with the exclusion of the Al-Ahram. Says Ms Yowakim: A large journalist in the Al-Ahram can print anything, a position merely partially agreed upon by Mr Shukrallah. LanguageMost of the English publications in Egypt header with the linguistic communication barrier the same manner. The Al-Ahram usage bi-lingual Egyptians, so they have small jobs. Egypt s Insight has no bilingual journalists. They do non see this a major job. The most of import thing is that they know what inquiries to inquire. Mr Scott Squire of Egypt Today really see the linguistic communication barrier an advantage. Most of the exiles do non talk Arabic either, and this makes publication in English an sole advantage. This is a position shared by Mr Kassem of the Cairo Times every bit good, who thinks printing in English facilitates selling advertisement infinite. And, he adds, publication in English makes it easier to win sympathy abroad. It is the lone force per unit area against the authorities to go forth us entirely. Reading patternsMs Yowakim of Egypt s Insight thinks the educational system plays a decisive function in how Egyptians view the printed word. Due to the tremendous volume of information they have to larn by bosom, they stop reading for leisure one time they get the opportunity, she says. We find that a batch of our concern readers merely look at the narratives that carry images of well-known concern individuals or famous persons, she continues. This is a fact they take into history when they plan each issue. Egypt Today portion this position. The demands of the different readership groups can be different to the extent of struggle. E.g. Features, which are by and large read by the al iens while arousing small enthusiasm amongst the Egyptian readers. DiscussionThere are a figure of grounds why the imperativeness face institutional limitations. The Egyptian printing license seem to be in limited supply due to the authoritiess wish to command the national information. Restricting the beginnings makes it easier for them to make so. Most of the publication obstacles seem to come from this want. Censoring seems to hold a somewhat different map. Censorship is a last-minute prohibition on paragraphs, articles or whole issues when the issue can t otherwise be stopped. It is thought that the major ground for censoring is to conceal links between the authorities and concern. The cultural jobs of printing in English in Egypt can be overcome. The linguistic communication is non a important barrier. There is a civilization of intuition towards people who ask inquiries. I have no ground to believe the authorities functionaries in Egypt are much different than the bureaucratism s anyplace, nevertheless. A free imperativeness is regarded as an indispensable ticker Canis familiaris, for democracy. It is sometimes referred to as the 4th province power. The 4th province power can neer be more independent than the bench, legislative and executive subdivisions of authorities are of each other. Can a free imperativeness exist in a state where the links between authorities and private economical minutess are to be kept secret at all costs? Where the surrounding states are capable of throw outing 100s of 1000s of Egyptian workers, and endanger to make so upon unfavorable judgment? The institutional jobs of printing in Egypt cover a figure of facets non needfully reserved for the English speech production imperativeness. The Torahs of registering printing companies in Egypt present impossible barriers. The revenue enhancement Torahs sing advertisement looms with menaces to control income. The Freezone revenue enhancement freedoms might good be used selectively, unde r the shield of national involvement, national security, or protection of national establishments. The definitions of libel are highly broad. The jurisprudence is otiose. Libel should be a affair of civilian tribunal process, and non a public one. But the largest job might be the one of printing industry in Egypt in the long tally. Mr Kassem observes that it will be impossible to sell off parts of the present governmental imperativeness. Cipher will desire to purchase portions in a company that is inefficaciously run, without being able to streamline it. Egypt has merely seven day-to-day newspapers. The little island of Malta has four. In relation to population, they have a 1300:1 better coverage of newspapers. The significance of each newspaper in Egypt therefore histories for about 200 Maltese newspapers. Bing careful, of class, that this lone serves as an illustration for the deceit of the Egyptian publication industry. On other histories, the Maltese illustration is unequal. The political weight each of the seven newspapers in Egypt carry is tremendous. The national security deductions are no less important. When the inevitable denationalization moving ridge catches up with the publication industry, they will confront immense jobs. International documents and involvements will be able to get down both English and Arabic documents, and run in free competition to the national documents. The nationalised documents can non be sold off, and few will desire to purchase portions with the present direction. They will hold jobs accommodating to the new environment. The Egyptian authorities will hold to see this when they make new Torahs for publication. It is non merely a affair of national security to command the publication industry in the short term. It is really a affair of national security to hold a national publication industry at all. ConclusionThere are obvious jobs of printing in English in Egypt. Language is regarded as being a minor job. The chief obstr uctions are the institutionalized barriers to printing. On the other side is Egypt s dependence upon trade and touristry. They receive a significant sum of assistance from the US. The English publications are one of Egypt s many faces abroad. It would make significant international fad if Egypt were to censor them All the independent documents think the freedom of address has loosened up in recent times. Mr Kassem Bankss on globalization, to acquire the concluding liberalization. I think the freedom of the imperativeness will germinate parallel to the development of the political system. In fact, the imperativeness plays a important function in the dynamism of the development of the political system in Egypt. Keeping named higher authorities functionaries responsible of their actions # 8211 ; which would be unheard of merely a twosome of twelvemonth s ago # 8211 ; is now usual in the documents. The Government is going witting of this duty. Government functionaries are scared of th e Al-Ahram, The Cairo Times and the Middle East Times. Sooner or subsequently this duty will hold to be institutionalised by jurisprudence. And jurisprudence that is enforced on an equal footing, for all its citizens, is the basis on which all democracies are built. AppendicesThe Middle East TimesThe largest foreign weeklyMr Rod CraigManaging EditorNovember 1998Printed in Athens, Greece Readers: chiefly expats, embassy personell and international. We aim for a wider circle. The Middle East Times used to cover the part, and we might get down that up once more. Cairo is the capital of the Arab universe, and therefore most of import. Few of our journalists master Arabic to a fluid extent, and we are dependent on the good will of transcribers and some bi-lingual native Arabic talkers. Say there is something secret traveling on, and the journalist covering the event does non cognize Arabic. If the transcriber figures the information might damage Egypt s repute, he or she might keep back some of the information. News narratives depend on the weakest nexus, and this is might be the Arabic journalist. On the other manus, the Arabic journalist might hold a more unfastened position and therefore go the strongest nexus. The job is, you don t know the difference. I am merely raising the issue here. I am non speaking about anyone in peculiar, nor about the Middle East Times. There is a different outlook between Arab and Western journalists. Merely like there are differences between American and British, and I am certain Norse journalists have their particular belongingss as good. Journalists have different moralss and point of views. Yet the differences among western journalists are non as widely apart as Western and Arabic. First of wholly, the western construct of free address is interpreted otherwise here. Arabic journalists are besides really witting of Egypt s repute, and this might change their coverage. But, of class, there are exclusions. Some Arabic journalists ha ve studied in the West, and seen how the imperativeness works at that place. Others merely want alteration. Their cognition of Arabic therefore makes them the strongest nexus in publication. Arabic journalists sometime ask to hold their name left out, as they know they will acquire into problem. One really got thumbed. But it s non merely here journalists are acquiring into problem. Whenever they are a nuisance, journalists are harassed. The map of the imperativeness I think is first of all to inform the populace. Journalists are, or should be, representatives of the populace. They should therefore investigation inquiries in order to convey light to different subjects relevant for the populace. They by and large should non hold sentiments by themselves. This happens of class, but a journalist should endeavor to be devoid of feelings. Jorunalists should be driven to wherever the information leads them. Merely like the police officer is for the jurisprudence. Arab journalists have ano ther function. They don t respect themselves as public retainers. The chief restraints to printing are self-constraints. The paper is responsible to its readers. So even in a state where the imperativeness is free to discourse whatever it wants, it restricts itself to what the readers can take. Most Arab journalists have neer been without institutionalized censoring or faith. They are used to be within reasonably narrow walls. In Egypt one can non knock the President. One should be most careful with respect to knocking old presidents as good. Last hebdomad ( ) a column we did on King Fahd was taken out. We were forcing it truly. The editorialist subsequently had problem traveling abroad due to accusals of danger to national security. After the president, one must go forth the military alone. Last, one can non knock Saudi Arabia. There are, of class, a figure of other issues one must avoid every bit good, but these three are sacred. For foreign publications, these regulations must be learned by experience. For the people who live here on the other manus, they know precisely where the bounds go. Egyptian documents are non censored. Censoring in Egypt was abolished by Sadat in 1974. Most of the influental documents are governmental, and if their editors step over the line, they are moved to a correspondence occupation in Luxor. They know what to make and what non to. Besides, it is the authorities who issues publishing licenses. The foreign imperativeness has to demo transcripts of its publications to the Advisory commettee. They cut out the articles they don Ts like, and have the authorization to censor an issue. It is of no intent to hold the Middle East Times off the streets, as our intent is to inform people. We have developed a particular agreement with the censors. We submit proofs to them, and they cut out paragraphs instead than taking whole articles. It is to their advantage besides to hold this relationship. It looks bad for them every bit good. We used to go forth the paragraphs space, but that is now illegal. But a good journalist can acquire an ything published. So when it comes to the things that are of import, one must seek to be cagey. For case, alternatively of utilizing the instead obvious word Anguish, we replace it with forceful persuasion. The readers will hold to set two and two together when they read the articles. The censors are merely making their occupation. If they let something controversial base on balls, they will acquire into problem. There is no usage in traveling against them, and holding a good relationship will give us more freedom. We have made an understanding, and by that the authorities is becomingmore favorable to us. I don t think it is just of The Cairo Times to rip off on this agreement. They have published issues without jostling it to the censors, and have had their undermentioned issue banned as retaliation. We should seek to contend for freedom of look together. It does non make any good to seek to besiege the ordinances that are agreed upon. The lone casualties will be members of the consultative commettee, and perchance a complete prohibition on the Cairo Times. We are up against benevolent people, and non the wicked. Egypt is dependent upon trade, and so they have to be reasonably sensible. We really acquire more readers when we get banned. But if it happens frequent ly adequate, I suppose people merely acquire used to it. My occupation as an editor is to acquire the paper out and to state the truth. It serves no intent to hold it taken off the street. I am responsible for the 30 or so occupations as good, which besides must be taken into consideration. It s an interesting experience all this. One gets the feeling that most governments are corrupt and censoring is to forestall the denudation of this. We are all right with the authorities. The publishing side, on the other manus, is extremely unstable. The Cyprus publications were first outright banned. The instance was so taken to the Supreme Court, and they gave a opinion of the forbiddance as unconstitutional. Then the authorities introduced 36 % revenue enhancement on magazines This revenue enhancement makes it hard to sell advertisement infinite. We merely went back to Greece to publish. It is really cheaper to purchase a plane ticket and pay a individual to travel back and Forth with the co gent evidence, than to publish in the Freezone. The freedom of look in Egypt is a batch freer than it used to be. Criticism of members in the cabinet is allowed, and even Mubarak was quoted as stating The promises made by some of my curates are about every bit dependable as those made by Netanyahu. The ( kosh ) incidence seems to hold been blown out of proportion. The Copts in America got clasp of the narrative, and some people got carried off. It took the attending off us, we were a minor enemy compared to this. The authorities learned to be more unfastened. When you try to hush something up, and it doesn t work, cipher will believe the updated narrative by the authorities. What they should hold done was to convey it all in the unfastened. If they had held a imperativeness conference and referred what had happened, and what steps were taken to forestall its being repeated, the incident would non hold been blown so out of proportion. I hope they learned their lesson. Egypt s Insight Lifestyle monthly magazineMs. Nahed YowakimEditor-in-ChiefDecember 1998 Printed in CyprusPublishes between 7-11 000 issues per monthSells to concern and travel related industry, expatriates and international Problems of printing in English in Egypt. Egypt s penetration has a varied reader circle. The aliens and exiles tend to read the characteristics and the longer articles, whereas the concern readers simply tend to look through the magazine If there is a image of an executive or a assemblage of known faces, they might read the sub-headings. It is non in the Egyptian up-bringing to read for leisure. They know English, but they are jammed with excessively much stuff to analyze by bosom. The reading stuff is non by their ain pick, and when they eventually can take, they stop reading wholly. Once I was on an plane with Egypt Air, I asked the hostess in Arabic for something to read. She was puzzled, and asked Why # 8211 ; there is a movie screening. She merely could non understand how I could prefer reading to watching any peculiar film. There is by and large a intuition on people who ask inquiries in this state. If the individuals inquiring them in add-on are aliens, it is non made easier. Photography is even worse. We will for case instead direct a immature female Egyptian to take images. . Language, nevertheless, is non so of import. At the present clip we don Ts have any bi-lingual journalists. IWe have transcribers who know arabic. The most of import thing is that the journalists know which inquiries to inquire, and how to acquire information. We have a good relationship with the censors. We show the consultative commission dubious articles, and the cogent evidence of the magazine. If we are covering anything controversial, we show them articles the Al-Ahram has written on the same subject. Politicss and Saudi Arabia is checked this manner. The ground why Saudi is so sacred, is non merely for political and economical issues. Saudi is a major employer of Egy ptians. If the Saudis want, they can throw out these people. Except for the fact of these people losing their occupations, the societal effects of such a organic structure of people coming back to unemployement in Egypt would be terrible. So in add-on to the political and economical dealingss with Saudi, there are tremendous societal dealingss. A author would non desire to be responsible for the ejection of all these people. A large author in Al-Ahram can print anything. This manner they have backup in instance their higher-ups come down on them. They are scared as good, as they will run into problem if something controversial is passed on with their knowing. We have kept a clean record, and this makes it harder for them to censor articles. I have been told if I stay off from certain issues in my first twelvemonth, I can be more make bolding the 2nd. Homosexuality, for case, is the one societal issue to avoid at the present. Except for that, most societal issues can be written about . And we have. The thing is to work with the censors instead than against them. We have a great advantage by being a monthly publication. When it comes to controversial issues such as the Coptic incidence in upper Egypt or the teenage stone music fans who went to imprison last twelvemonth, we can wait until the Government realises its error and so cover it. It is highly of import to endorse up the facts. Tape interviews and look into information. When good news media has been done, and the editors back up their authors # 8211 ; like Hishem Kassam and Diana Digges in the Cairo Times # 8211 ; it makes it much harder for the authorities to censor it. It is when trigger-happy new journalists starts hiting in all waies that they say no. A batch of the resistance newspapers work like this. Their attack is sleazy and un- serious. Like when the covered an un-named bellydancer s response of a payoff. If they had the information, they could print the names and descriptions. If they don Ts, they should go forth it. Government functionaries are afraid of the Al-Ahram. Writers such as Feroh Hosni have made ferocious onslaughts on curates. But so it has been good backed up. The job arises when authors in Al-Ahram are paid to compose up or down people. You neer truly cognize. We have uncertainnesss sing the publication side. There is a 36 % revenue enhancement on income generated by advertisement. We go to publish in Cyprus. When the magazine is imported into Egypt, we pay an import revenue enhancement. We do non believe it is sensible to pay both a domestic revenue enhancement on income generated in Cyprus, when we at the same clip are paying the import responsibilities. The import revenue enhancement is 7-10 % on printing costs. We hope our history of paying the import revenue enhancement will take the authorities to make up ones mind on its continuation, instead than implementing the strangeling advertisement revenue enhancement. It will be really hard to sell advertise ment infinite if the monetary values had to be increased by 36 % The Al-Ahram WeeklyThe largest authorities paperMr.Hani ShukrallahManaging EditorDecember 1998Printed in Cairo by the Al-Ahram imperativeness Sometimes we get off with things ( the other publications ) don T, because we are the Al-Ahram. The tradition of news media affects authors and editors. There are two facets we in Al-Ahram strive to set up. One: We like to go on in the tradition of nonsubjective news media, and Second: we do non like to sound like a propaganda sheet for the government.This is decidedly a job For case, we neer present statements made by the ministry of information or the constabulary as facts. We ever make it really clear where these statements come from. We are most careful to avoid printing such information as fact. We like to print both sides of the narrative, and what the other side thinks. There are decidedly restraints, but we stretch the borders. For case utilizing a page for human rights a nd mentioning phone Numberss in this issue ( 9 December ) is decidedly agitative. We are non being censored, and we have non yet received a warning. We can discourse any subject we d like, unless we receive a memo signifier the prosecuting officers office enforcing a prohibition on instances and subjects. These memos are public, and are being sent to all the media in Egypt. The Al-Ahram expressions at events with Egyptian eyes. We see jobs, events, political occurrences or whatever in this visible radiation. A foreign letter writer might concentrate on different subjects all together, or even see some of our articles as non of import. A foreign letter writer would see things in a different visible radiation. All journalists face jobs. It does do life easier for our journalists to hold the Al-Ahram name endorsing them up. We run contrary to the interior ministry s general policy on media in Egypt. We are decidedly the oldest non the first publication, and we were ever large. The old editor Heykem continued the tradition of Al-Ahram after Nassers nationalization. We are more like the British Times, and El Akbar is closer to the Mirror. The Egyptian Gazette is non truly anything. Basically we see what they do, and so we try non to make the same. I am happy about Cairo Times and Middle East Times for the competition. It is nonmeaningful to be better than the Egyptian Gazette. The Al-Ahram can make things the others would non be allowed to. We have written about anguish in Egyptian prisons, but we don t travel excessively much into the inside informations. We have characteristics on societal issues that reveal a batch. But we are ever careful that the Government position comes through. But so as a defined sentiment. It is non prevailing. We are stretching the bounds. If the authorities does non like it, they ll fire me # 8211 ; or person else in the column board. There is no censoring There is an exercising of self-censorship in chiseled facets. We do give certain infinite to the president, irrespective of what he is making. Some of this would non normally be considered newsworthy by western criterions of news media. Saudi Arabia is non needfully sacred. It depends on the subject. We covered the tribunal instance of Mubarak s boy, who took a Saudi paper to tribunal for libel. We leave the president, of class. We don t criticise anyone by name. We will describe it ( in the paper ) if person attacks a curate, and we will mention what the curate says himself. The libel Torahs in this state are absurd. Mustafa Bakim should be fined for libel, but he can travel on because he is assailing the right people. It is merely when you are assailing the incorrect people you have a libel. We report what each side is stating. Even our editorialists adhere to this. The imperativeness jurisprudence of 93 is merely like all the other imperativeness Torahs atrocious. It is absurd to Torahs against libel, and the application in this state is merely strong-arming . Equally long as you attack the right people it is all right, but Fahmi Mohammed gets six months for an nonsubjective statement. Hooliganism. I don t see anything loosening up in this state. That is a personal statement, of class, and non as editor of The Al-Ahram weekly. The sensationalist imperativeness is really calumniatory They have province backup. In fact, they have interior ministry backup. The authorities made a large hair about the xanthous imperativeness, and passed Torahs to forbid it, when they themselves were partially responsible for it. Criticism against corruptness and links between concern and province functionaries is to be avoided. The censoring and libel Torahs were all passed to impede the denudation of these links. The jurisprudence of 1993 was to close this up, and they succeeded. The authorities is happy to see the present state of affairs go on, every bit long as certain ruddy lines are non overstepped. We don t get into unknoting or researching who is pay ing who. It would be interesting, but everybody in authorities is making concern, so it is better to go forth it entirely. Leave it to the others. The Cairo TimesFortnightly Newsmagazine Mr Hisham KassemPublisherDecember 1998Printed in the Freezone, Nasr City The jobs of printing in English is merely a portion of the job with the publication industry in this state. In fact, there are a figure of advantages of publication in English. It is easier to sell advertisement infinite, and it is easier to win sympathy abroad. The support from abroad is the lone force per unit area to the authorities to go forth us entirely. But the job is non English publication, but the publication Torahs in general. Before the imperativeness Torahs of 1996, it was virtually impossible to register a publication company in Egypt. In order to register, one had to hold 200 stockholders all with equal portions. There is merely one company in Egypt, which is registered harmonizing to these standards. The proprie tor, ( Scoldel Midan ) , is a member of the ( Shia ) council. And in pattern he owns the ( Mahmood Shiewi ) himself, as he fundamentally merely got his friends to subscribe up.. He has the power of lawyer from all the stockholders and hires and fires at will. After 1996 one needed merely 10 stockholders still with equal portions. Three publications have managed to register ; all are Arabic talking newspapers. These are the EL Osboa, the El Nebaa and the Sortel Ooma. Yet you need permission from the province security and the national security. You need to be more than good friends with these to acquire your blessing. At present there are 22 other companies who have their applications in without acquiring a licence. You used to be able to appeal to the higher imperativeness council. Now you besides need a license from the cabinet before you can use, and their determination is concluding. I.e. you can non appeal. Janni, I tell you it s hard. When I went to the higher imperativeness cou ncil in September 96 to look into the Torahs, I discovered that they had non met for two old ages. They had all sorts of applications that were merely lying at that place Handicap magazines, athleticss magazines and so on. The higher imperativeness council does non desire to get down a new tendency by leting some and non others. When people threatened to action, the authorities intervened as they defined it as affairs of national security. In any instance, it is unconstitutional. No administrative edicts are immune from entreaty by the citizens. They can t alter the fundamental law, for they don Ts have that sort of firepower. So it is truly merely a inquiry of clip before they have to emancipate the imperativeness. Due to the unconstitutional enrollment Torahs, 80 % of Egypt s publications are registered abroad, and therefore treated as foreign. Censoring for Egyptian publications was abolished in 1974. Foreign documents are a affair of national security, and apt to censorship. Aro und 200 documents are presently registered in Cyprus. It does non truly count where they are registered, they will ever be regarded as portion of the Cyprus imperativeness. Some are unserious and a few are serious. A proportion of the documents are downright con-jobs, where commissioners of authorities publicizing topographic point ads and so divide the money with the publishing houses. But some are serious. The foreign imperativeness is non allowed to publicize on broadcast televison the most effectual manner of making the population. It is besides impossible to acquire bank loans, and selling equity portions is besides out of the inquiry. This places utmost restrictions to growing, This whole apparatus, where 80 % of Egypt s publications are registered abroad, comes all out of the authoritiess wish to retain control of content. There are merely about 6-7 publication houses in Egypt, who is publishing approximately 30 different publications. Malta has a population of 370 000, and h ave 4 dailies. We have 7 dailies and a population of 65 million. Malta is non an emerging state. It has no industry. With all due regard to the Maltese, if the Island sunk in the ocean # 8211 ; it would non remain in the headlines for more than a hebdomad. Yet they have 1300 times more publications than Egypt per capita. In add-on, the seven publication houses are losing money. The Al-Ahram might do a net income, but non more than a ten percent of its possible. The Cyprus imperativeness is weak, and it is improbable that these will last long into the hereafter. The Al-Ahram late bought a new imperativeness that cost 600 million Egyptian lbs. It runs for about an hr a twenty-four hours. It has capacity to run 20-22 hours a twenty-four hours. If the Al-Ahram was to better with coloring material, they had to purchase it. But it is non run harmonizing to economic rules. They are losing an tremendous sum of money each hr the imperativeness does non run. At the really least, it should ru n 15 hours a twenty-four hours. Printing in Egypt is a tool for the authorities to remain in power. They are willing to pay a batch for this. As a consequence, cipher in the upper or in-between direction of the Egyptian imperativeness knows how to run an economically sound operation, The Egyptian authorities does non gain that it is really a affair of national security to hold an information industry that works, When it is working 1300 times under the Maltese capacity, it can non be said to work. Egypt is dependent upon trade, and sooner or later all public companies will hold to be privatised. The publication industry, nevertheless, can non be sold as Stella or a cement mill. What happens if states a batch less unfastened than Egypt starts purchasing these companies. Say Iraq, Libya or Sudan buys the Al-Ahram. How will this affect national security? Yet merely selling equal proportions of portions will non work. Without a bulk, the purchaser will non hold an chance to re-organise a nd streamline the operation. With the makings of the current upper and in-between direction, who will desire to purchase a portion? And for all the attempts of the Egyptian authorities to command information, they do non win. I can compose an article for the Al Akbar, or I can direct it to any international paper. Peoples will still be able to read it. So the Egyptian authorities in world can t command what is published in Egypt. An ex. intelligence officer heads the censoring commission. He has a history from the province information services, which used to be where they placed troublesome authors. They d be transferred at that place, without specific undertakings to carry through. They were merely picking up their pay at the beginning of every month. But this adult male belongs to the cold war. He believes it is still on. Like the Nipponese solider they found 40 old ages after the war on a desolate island. He is 73 old ages old 13 old ages past retirement and gets a presidential e dict each twelvemonth leting him to go on. He shows up each twenty-four hours at one. I refuse to pay them anything. Not so much out of rule as of the cognition that they will bang the door in my face when we get banned. They are non powerful plenty to let go of anything. But it s truly merely a inquiry of clip. Who would hold thought the Berlin Wall would fall a month before? The authorities attending to information is closer to animal inherent aptitude. It is blinding them. It is really closer to treason that an carnal thrust allows you to pretermit an industry so related to national security. I am foremost on the most wanted list of publications the authorities wants to shut. I have been banned six times this twelvemonth a new record but the issue is non free address. The authorities is seeking to halt H2O fluxing down the drain. It is impossible. In two or three old ages they will hold to allow travel. We are looking at the hereafter of the full publication industry in Egypt. Wh at will we make with our free address if we have no agencies of printing it? Who will vie with Le Figaro or Le Monde when they start runing in this state? Letter from exileby Thomas Cronwell, Editor of Middle East TimesCopyright 1997 The Middle East Times. All rights reserved. As you may hold noticed, I am no longer printing and redacting this paper from a place in Cairo. I hope the conditions is all right in my absence ( I do love fall in Cairo ) because the ambiance of ever-tightening control of the imperativeness in Egypt is directing clouds of concern over the journalistic community and making ripplings of turbulency that are barely a benefit for Egypt. The new imperativeness jurisprudence, for one, can barely be considered media-friendly, with its prejudice clearly prefering an constitution unwilling to digest unfavorable judgment from the imperativeness. The libel Torahs are so strongly supportive of the possible marks of unmaskings, fact-finding coverage or critical commentar ies that editors and publishing houses are progressively worried about what they can publish. The Egyptian authorities often says the state has a free imperativeness. This is non truly the instance. Publications with any kind of political content are either controlled by the authorities or by political parties. With the state so wholly under the control of the governing National Democratic Party, this means that all the major media variety meats, such as the day-to-day Al Ahram, Al Akhbar and Al Gomhuriya, are government-controlled. The most significant non-government paper is the Wafd, owned by the party of that name. But its docket is to back up its proprietors and non to seek out the truth. With wireless and telecasting wholly owned and operated by the Ministry of Information, there are in fact no independent political newspapers in Egypt. Hence the jobs faced by this 1. When we pursue articles that seem of importance to Egypt, whether it be in the kingdom of security affairs, in ter-communal dealingss, offense, the political procedures and so on. We are frequently skating on thin ice because no other Egypt-based publication has raised these issues from an independent and nonsubjective vantage point. Hence each hebdomad we have to go through through a censoring procedure. ( Egyptian-based or -owned media are non censored, but editors and authors have to mind of the imperativeness jurisprudence, and there are some tabus, such as knocking the caput of province. All imported foreign-owned media are apt to censorship. ) Our dealingss with our censors are by and large good, and we frequently enter lively argument over what should be allowed and what non. Better to hold the authorities censor you than to hold to ban yourself, I would state. We can neer be certain what will put off dismay bells in the censor # 8217 ; s head, but narratives on everything from domestic force in Egyptian places ( based on a government-issued study ) , to a mostly sympathetic reapprai sal of President Hosni Mubarak # 8217 ; s 15 old ages in power have been cut or caused the paper to be banned wholly. An column I wrote knocking the Saudi system was pulled out, and seemingly my congratulations for Jordan was taken as an abuse to Egypt. Egypt is a great state with a great people. It has an alone history with a alone archaeological bequest. It besides has lovely countries of great natural beauty, such as the Red Sea with its motley fish, and dramatic stretches of the Nile and northern coastline. And yet, after a revolution that unseated the monarchy, a long experiment with socialism under Nasser, and more unfastened, business-oriented policies under Sadat and Mubarak, it still has non achieved a recognizable modern theoretical account for its being. Although the argument about Egypt s nowadays and hereafter that so involvements the Middle East Times seems worrying to some of Egypt # 8217 ; s official watchdog organisations, we believe the issues deserve aerating an d we will go on to make so every bit long as we are able.Press censor denies censorship Lutfi Abdel KaderHeads the office of the foreign pressby Richard Engel, Middle East Times staffCopyright 1997 The Middle East Times. All rights reserved. What is the function of this office? First of wholly if you come to me and inquire is at that place censorship or non, I would wish to state that censoring was canceled following a determination of President Sadat in 1974. Since this day of the month our work is merely now to see what the intelligence media write about Egypt. This is our work, to do certain articles are right or non. There is no censoring. If there is something we don t approve [ of ] we say to the people responsible: Don t compose it once more. Like what we do with your newspaper. This is the function of our office. Our office has two subdivisions. This is the subdivision for foreign intelligence. There is another subdivision at the Ministry of Information to cognize what the [ local ] documents write. [ In fact ] we assist the main editor to give him intelligence he can non obtain. We help the people working in London and abroad. This is the existent function of our office. Every hebdomad we bring in our newspaper and subsequently we receive a call stating no to such and such a paragraph or This article doesn T work, take it delight. Why does your office make this? It prevents us from describing. No we don t. But we prevent that which goes out of line merely this. We see the newspaper and our people read it and when they find anything that is non good for our state, we contact the people responsible and we ask them non to publish it once more and we release the paper. This is what we do. But I would wish to add that there is no censoring for the documents written in our state like Al Ahram and Al Akhbar. What about resistance documents like Al Shaab? No censoring at all. They print what they want to state and the people who are hurt by what is written in Al Shaab can reply, like what is written about Hassan Al Alfi. Alfi didn T do anything against Al Shaab, but merely expressed his sentiment to state that Al Shaab is incorrect. Al Shaab can publish what of all time they want? Yes. But we are in a different situation.Yes. Two hebdomads ago we printed a interlingual rendition of an sentiment taken from the Hakika newspaper and this office asked us non to publish it. But it was already on the streets. Why? Because you wrote it in a bad manner, non precisely likeAl Hakika. This is the of import point, to see what you took from Al Hakika and put in your paper. If you took it precisely like it was in Al Hakika, we wouldn Ts have opposed [ it ] . This is the difference between us. You wrote what the Hakika says, but non precisely what they wrote. We opposed because you said that Al Hakika wrote this. We referred to Al Hakika and found that what was written was non precisely like [ what ] you printed. How do you react to those abroad who c riticize Egypt for censoring? I would state to those people to see Egypt and see the people. They will happen all the foreign documents sold here. I say to them, come to Egypt and walk the streets and see the people selling all the foreign documents geting in Egypt. So there is no censoring. There is an office of censoring for film and books. How many offices are at that place? This is the office for foreign newspapers and books, for film there is another office. What subjects do you most frequently have to take? We don t remove, but merely if we are non satisfied with the coverage refering our president, our state, the people in our state and [ articles which ] study that everything is bad in our state # 8230 ; we are non satisfied. But we don t take it. What if you are non satisfied with an article in Newsweek, for illustration, what make you make? If it is a bad narrative and it is non suited to our policy and our attitude, we foremost of all warn their office here non to compos e such things. If they write it once more we are obliged non to let go of it. The one accident was when Anwar Sadat was the swayer of our state. He didn t accept what was written inNewsweek for 24 hours, but so he gave an order to this office to let go of the paper even though it was really bad. So we can state our censoring is non like in many Arab states or foreign states # 8230 ; we are really soft. We say now that all that is go oning in the universe is declared in many documents. Can a journalist be expelled if he writes excessively many articles that this office finds unsatisfactory? No, such things now are non done. To take a co-respondent from Egypt was canceled more than 25 old ages ago. We know what he s traveling to [ write ] is issued abroad, so we don t oppose it. Is this office medium to the demands of foreign policy? You know that Israel wrote many strong articles against Mubarak and we allowed them to come into the state. The last article was in the Jerusalem Post a nd the article was a bad onslaught on Mubarak, but we allowed it in. What was written was non refering policy, but his character. Are documents free to compose about President Mubarak s household? If you read our newspapers you will happen many narratives about Mubarak and his married woman and boies. There is no censoring. What about Islam? You can compose about Islam what you like, but non assailing it. You can state that Islam has many basic rules and things such as that. But you can non assail our Prophet Mohammed. You approve if anyone were to assail [ Jesus ] ? It is the same thing. When you say things that are non existent, or non true that is what is non allowed. Who has the concluding determination about let go ofing a sensitive article? Minister of Information Safwat Sharif. But President Mubarak warns us non to keep articles. First of all I tell the curate of information that such and such a magazine wrote an article about Mubarak and that from our point of position we do n t approve it. I send the article to [ Sharif ] and he gives me a determination after one or two hours.This doesn T go on frequently, possibly one time a month or every two hebdomads, non every twenty-four hours. 363

Round II Of The Hundred Years War Essays - House Of Valois

Round II of the Hundred Years War Generally the last, and decisive, phase of the Hundred Years' War (1415-1453) is not well covered in most modern English or American histories of Western warfare. If not ignored completely, the reconquests by the French army of Charles VII are given the skimpiest summary treatment. Even popular French histories often close the coverage of the military events with the arrival of Joan of Arc, and suggest that this introduced a moral prerogative which outweighed military factors. There were obviously many more factors that lead to the expulsion of the English in 1453. The second phase of the Hundred Years War is far more crucial than the first phase, much like a football game, the second half being where the game is won or lost, not the first. As is the case in the Hundred Years War, the second phase decided the war. As in most examinations of war, emphasis will be laid on the origins of the second out break of war, the course of the second phase of the Hundred Years War, and the impact the war had on medieval Europe. The origins of the second phase of the Hundred Years War, can be directly linked to the first phase, Edward III claim to the French crown. The first phase of the war ended because of domestic crises in both countries. Hostilities still remained high during the relative peace that ensued between the two periods of the war, and there was no question if the war would resume, but rather only, when it would resume. This is seen with French troops assisting in a Scottish invasion of England in 1402.1 And again with the French sending an expedition to England to assist in Owen Glendower's revolt in Wales, against king Henry IV, but withdrew as the rebellion faltered.2 The French continued to harass the English during the so called truce. The English were just as hostile to the French, they supported many of the Flemish uprisings in France and English Barons in France would continue to raid the French countryside between 1373 and 1415.3 But what was the spark that relit the flame of war again in 1415? A civil war had been ragging in France since 1407, with the assassination of Charles VI's brother, Louis duc d'Orl?ans, by Jean 'the Fearless', duke of Burgundy. This resulted in open civil war in France between partisans of the duke of Burgundy (Burgundians) and those of the duke of Orl?ans, called 'Armagnacs'. When Henry V took the English throne in 1413, he decided to take advantage of the political turmoil in France to renew the English Kings claim to the French thrown. He quickly formed an alliance with Jean the Fearless, and the Burgundians in May of 1413. Two years after the alliance was formed Henry V invaded France with the help of the Burgundians, on September 23 the English captured Harfleur and on October 25 defeated a French army at Agincourt. These were the beginnings of the second phase of the Hundred Years War.4 The second phase of the Hundred Years War resembled the first phase, in that the English won overwhelming victories at the beginning and conquered much land, but in the end lost it all back to the French. The second phase began with the invasion of Henry V into France in 1415, he soon captured Harfleur and won a decisive victory at Agincourt. The battle is described by Jehan de Waurin, a French nobleman who fought against the English. Then the English archers, who, as I have said, were in the wings, saw that they were near enough, and began to send arrow on the French with great vigor. The said archers were for the most part in their doublets, without armor, their stockings rolled up to their knees, and having hatchets and battle-axes or great swords hanging at their girdles; some were bare-footed and bare-headed, others had caps of boiled leather, and others of osier, covered with harpoy or leather. Then the French, seeing the English come towards them in this fashion, placed themselves in order, every one under his banner, their helmets on their heads. The constable, the marshal, the admirals, and the other princes earnestly exhorted their men to fight the

Sample Essay Questions About Science

Sample Essay Questions About ScienceSample essay questions about science may be more appropriate for your students in high school or middle school. This is where the literature and science studies come into play. Students who are interested in science and have some knowledge of the subject in high school will be able to get a more thorough understanding of what goes on when they get a better education. These sample essay questions about science can help to guide the topics that are being discussed in the essay for further study in the future.College applicants and admission officials are going to want to understand the different types of science that are being covered in the essay, and how these themes relate to a student's education. Students should be able to write essays about topics that will have relevance for their career or where they plan to work after college. It is also a good idea to address aspects of biology, chemistry, or physics in the essay so that the writing and rea ding skills of the student are up to par for college level assignments. Other students may need to get help from a teacher to complete these types of essay samples.Students in the sixth and seventh grade have already been exposed to science topics through movies and television. The subject matter will still be relevant to them at this stage of their education, but the forms of education that they have learned at this time may not be enough to prepare them for college level work in science and technology. While writing an essay about science is one of the hardest types of assignments, getting some practice on these sample essay questions about science can give students a head start when it comes to college.Sample science questions are usually questions that are given to students in classrooms and offices in the laboratory. Students who are involved in field research in the school are going to be asked questions about various aspects of the research they have completed. Sometimes stud ents will have to write papers that are about the research they are conducting and their findings. Teachers will look for students to write a paper based on their research, and they may ask them to answer a few sample essay questions about science before they begin the project.Writing a short essay for sample essay questions about science can be a very difficult task. Students need to show that they can handle the rigors of writing a solid essay by preparing well. Some tips for preparing for these types of essays include practicing in small groups with friends or family members. Getting some structure for writing the essay will help students stay on task and will keep them from getting overwhelmed.Once students know what types of subjects they will be covering in the essay, they should take the time to find out the kind of reader they are. Since there are a number of essay samples that have to do with science, it is important for students to know what type of information they want t o present to the reader. When a student knows what information they want to include in their essay, they can choose between writing a science fiction or fantasy style essay or a more factual essay. Students can also write short science essays that are concerned with particular scientific subjects such as evolution or genetics.There are also essays that have to do with how science can affect society. Students can write about how society has made advances in medicine and science, or how science and technology are impacting different areas of society. Students should be able to discuss how science can affect society in a positive way, and show how they are excited about what the future holds for the human race.Different types of essay samples can be used depending on the student's abilities. Some students may be able to focus on topics that would best suit their personality, while others will be better suited for essays that have to do with science and society. Students should learn th e best types of questions to use when writing an essay about science so that they can be sure to answer every question accurately.

Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essays

Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essays Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essay Abortion Is Immoral 2 Essay JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=jphil. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [emailprotected] org. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. s collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. jstor. org WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 183 WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL T n HE view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, seriouslyim- moral has received little support in the recent philosophical literature. No doubt most philosophers affiliated with secular institutions of higher education believe that the anti-abortion position is either a symptom of irrational religious dogma or a conclusion generated by seriously confused philosophical argument. The purpose of this essay is to undermine this general belief. This essay sets out an argument that purports to show, as well as any argument in ethics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being. The argument is based on a major assumption. Many of the most insightful and careful writers on the ethics of abortion-such as Joel Feinberg, Michael Tooley, Mary Anne Warren, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. , L. W. Sumner, John T. Noonan, Jr. and Philip Devinebelieve that whether or not abortion is morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will assume, but not argue, that they are correct. Also, this essay will neglect issues of great importance to a complete ethics of abortion. Some anti-abortionists will allow that certain abortions, such as abortion before implantation or abortion when the life of a woman is threatened by a pregnancy or abortion after rape, may be morally permissible. This essay will not explore the casuistry of these hard cases. The purpose of this essay is to develop a general argument for the claim that the overwhelming majority of deliberate abortions are seriously immoral. I. A sketch of standard anti-abortion and pro-choice arguments exhibits how those arguments possess certain symmetries that explain why partisans of those positions are so convinced of the correctness of their own positions, why they are not successful in convincing Feinberg, Abortion, in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Tom Regan, ed. New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 256-293; Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, Philosophy and Public Affairs, ii, 1 (1972):37-65, Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford, 1984); Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, The Monist, I. vii, 1 (1973):4361; Engelhardt, The Ontology of Abortion, Ethics, lxxxiv, 3 (1974):217-234; Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton: University Pre ss, 1981); Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, Noonan, ed. Cambridge: Harvard, 1970); and Devine, The Ethics of Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell, 1978). 0022-362X /89/8604/183-22 (? 1989 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 184 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY their opponents, and why, to others, this issue seems to be unresolvable. An analysis of the nature of this standoff suggests a strategy for surmounting it. Consider the way a typical anti-abortionist argues. She will argue or assert that life is present from the moment of conception or that fetuses look like babies or that fetuses possess a characteristic such as a genetic code that is both necessary and sufficient for being human. Anti-abortionists seem to believe that (1) the truth of all of these claims is quite obvious, and (2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to show that abortion is morally akin to murder. A standard pro-choice strategy exhibits similarities. The prochoicer will argue or assert that fetuses are not persons or that fetuses are not rational agents or that fetuses are not social beings. Pro-choicers seem to believe that (1) the truth of any of these claims is quite obvious, and (2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to show that an abortion is not a wrongful killing. In fact, both the pro-choice and the anti-abortion claims do seem to be true, although the it looks like a baby claim is more difficult to establish the earlier the pregnancy. We seem to have a standoff. How can it be resolved? As everyone who has taken a bit of logic knows, if any of these arguments concerning abortion is a good argument, it requires not only some claim characterizing fetuses, but also some general moral principle that ties a characteristic of fetuses to having or not having the right to life or to some other moral characteristic that will generate the obligation or the lack of obligation not to end the life of a fetus. Accordingly, the arguments of the anti-abortionist and the pro-choicer need a bit of filling in to be regarded as adequate. Note what each partisan will say. The anti-abortionist will claim that her position is supported by such generally accepted moral principles as It is always prima facie seriously wrong to take a human life or It is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the life of a baby. Since these are generally accepted moral principles, her position is certainly not obviously wrong. The pro-choicer will claim that her position is supported by such plausible moral principles as Being a person is what gives an individual intrinsic moral worth or It is only seriously prima facie wrong to take the life of a member of the human community. Since these are generally accepted moral principles, the pro-choice position is certainly not obviously wrong. Unfortunately, we have again arrived at a standoff. Now, how might one deal with this standoff? The standard approach is to try to show how the moral principles of ones opponent lose their plausibility under analysis. It is easy to see how this is WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAI, 185 possible. On the one hand, the anti-abortionist will defend a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing which tends to be broad in scope in order that even fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy will fall under it. The problem with broad principles is that they often embrace too much. In this particular instance, the principle It is always prima facie wrong to take a human life seems to entail that it is wrong to end the existence of a living human cancercell culture, on the grounds that the culture is both living and human. Therefore, it seems that the anti-abortionists favored principle is too broad. On the other hand, the pro-choicer wants to find a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing which tends to be narrow in scope in order that fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with narrow principles is that they often do not embrace enough. Hence, the needed principles such as It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill only persons or It is prima facie wrong to kill only rational agents do not explain why it is wrong to kill infants or young children or the severely retarded or even perhaps the severely mentally ill. Therefore, we seem again to have a standoff. The anti-abortionist charges, not unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too broad to be acceptable. Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficulties in their positions run into further difficulties. The anti-abortionist will try to remove the problem in her position by reformulating her principle concerning killing in terms of human beings. Now we end up with: It is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the life of a human being. This principle has the advantage of avoiding the problem of the human cancer-cell culture counterexample. But this advantage is purchased at a high price. For although it is clear that a fetus is both human and alive, it is not at all clear that a fetus is a human being. There is at least something to be said for the view that something becomes a human bei ng only after a process of development, and that therefore first trimester fetuses and perhaps all fetuses are not yet human beings. Hence, the anti-abortionist, by this move, has merely exchanged one problem for another. The pro-choicer fares no better. She may attempt to find reasons why killing infants, young children, and the severely retarded is 2 For interesting discussions of this issue, see Warren Quinn, Abortion: Identity and Loss, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiii, 1 (1984):24-54; and Lawrence C. Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, Philosophy and Public Affairs, iv, 4 (1975):334-359. 186 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY wrong which are independent of her major principle that is supposed to explain the wrongness of taking human life, but which will not also make abortion immoral. This is no easy task. Appeals to social utility will seem satisfactory only to those who resolve not to think of the enormous difficulties with a utilitarian account of the wrongness of killing and the significant social costs of preserving the lives of the unproductive. 3 A pro-choice strategy that extends the definition of person to infants or even to young children seems just as arbitrary as an anti-abortion strategy that extends the definition of human being to fetuses. Again, we find symmetries in the two positions and we arrive at a standoff. There are even further problems that reflect symmetries in the two positions. In addition to counterexample problems, or the arbitrary application problems that can be exchanged for them, the standard anti-abortionist principle It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill a human being, or one of its variants, can be objected to on the grounds of ambiguity. If human being is taken to be a biological category, then the anti-abortionist is left with the problem of explaining why a merely biological category should make a moral difference. Why, it is asked, is it any more reasonable to base a moral conclusion on the number of chromosomes in ones cells than on the color of ones skin? 4If human being, on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is a human being cannot be taken to be a premise in the anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely what needs to be established. Hence, either the antiabortionists main category is a morally irrelevant, merely biological category, or it is of no use to the anti-abortionist in establishing (noncircularly, of course) that abortion is wrong. Although this problem with the anti-abortionist position is often noticed, it is less often noticed that the pro-choice position suffers from an analogous problem. The principle Only persons have the right to life also suffers from an ambiguity. The term person is typically defined in terms of psychological characteristics, although there will certainly be disagreement concerning which characteristics are most important. Supposing that this matter can be settled, the pro-choicer is left with the problem of explaining why psychological characteristics should make a moral difference. If the pro-choicer should attempt to deal with this problem by claiming that an explanaFor example, see my Ethics and The Elderly: Some Problems, in Stuart Spicker, Kathleen Woodward, and David Van Tassel, eds. , Aging and the Elderly: Humanistic Perspectives in Gerontology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1978), pp. 341-355. 4See Warren, op. cit. , and Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 187 tion is not necessary, that in fact we do treat such a cluster of psychological properties as having moral significance, the sharp-witted anti-abortionist should have a ready response. We do treat being both living and human as having moral significance. If it is legitimate for the pro-choicer to demand that the anti-abortionist provide an explanation of the connection between the biological character of being a human being and the wrongness of being killed (even though people accept this connection), then it is legitimate for the antiabortionist to demand that the pro-choicer provide an explanation of the connection between psychological criteria for being a person and the wrongness of being killed (even though that connection is accepted). Feinberg has attempted to meet this objection (he calls psychological personhood commonsense personhood): that The characteristics confer commonsensepersonhoodare not arbitrarybases for rights and duties, such as race, sex or species membership;ratherthey are traitsthat makesense out of rightsand duties and wouldhaveno point or function. It withoutwhichthose moralattributes is becausepeople are conscious;havea sense of theirper sonalidentities; haveplans,goals, and projects;experienceemotions;are liableto pains, anxieties, and frustrations;can reason and bargain, and so on-it is becauseof these ttributesthat people havevaluesand interests,desires and expectationsof their own, includinga stake in their own futures, and a personalwell-beingof a sort we cannot ascribeto unconsciousor nonrationalbeings. Because of their developed capacitiesthey can assume duties and responsibilities can have and makeclaimson one and another. Only becauseof their sense of self, their life plans, their value hierarchies,and their stakesin their own futures can they be ascribed fundamentalrights. There is nothing arbitraryabout these linkages (op. cit. , p. 270). The plausible aspects of this attempt should not be taken to obscure its implausible features. There is a great deal to be said for the view that being a psychological person under some description is a necessary condition for having duties. One cannot have a duty unless one is capable of behaving morally, and a beings capability of behaving morally will require having a certain psychology. It is far from obvious, however, that having rights entails consciousness or rationality, as Feinberg suggests. We speak of the rights of the severely retarded or the severely mentally ill, yet some of these persons are not rational. We speak of the rights of the temporarily unconscious. The New Jersey Supreme Court based their decision in the Quinlan case This seems to be the fatal flaw in Warrens treatment of this issue. 188 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY on Karen Ann Quinlans right to privacy, and she was known to be permanently unconscious at that time. Hence, Feinbergs claim that having rights entails being conscious is, on its face, obviously false. Of course, it might not make sense to attribute rights to a being that would never in its natural history have certain psychological traits. This modest connection between psychological personhood and moral personhood will create a place for Karen Ann Quinlan and the temporarily unconscious. But then it makes a place for fetuses also. Hence, it does not serve Feinbergs pro-choice purposes. Accordingly, it seems that the pro-choicer will have as much difficulty bridging the gap between psychological personhood and personhood in the moral sense as the anti-abortionist has bridging the gap between being a biological human being and being a human being in the moral sense. Furthermore, the pro-choicer cannot any more escape her problem by making person a purely moral category than the anti-abortionist could escape by the analogous move. For if person is a moral category, then the pro-choicer is left without the resources for establishing (noncircularly, of course) the claim that a fetus is not a person, which is an essential premise in her argument. Again, we have both a symmetry and a standoff between pro-choice and antiabortion views. Passions in the abortion debate run high. There are both plausibilities and difficulties with the standard positions. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that partisans of either side embrace with fervor the moral generalizations that support the conclusions they preanalytically favor, and reject with disdain the moral generalizations of their opponents as being subject to inescapable difficulties. It is easy to believe that the counterexamples to ones own moral principles are merely temporary difficulties that will dissolve in the wake of further philosophical research, and that the counterexamples to the principles of ones opponents are as straightforward as the contradiction between A and 0 propositions in traditional logic. This might suggest to an impartial observer (if there are any) that the abortion issue is unresolvable. There is a way out of this apparent dialectical quandary. The moral generalizations of both sides are not quite correct. The generalizations hold for the most part, for the usual cases. This suggests that they are all accidental generalizations, that the moral claims made by those on both sides of the dispute do not touch on the essence of the matter. This use of the distinction between essence and accident is not meant to invoke obscure metaphysical categories. Rather, it is in- WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 189 tended to reflect the rather atheoretical nature of the abortion discussion. If the generalization a partisan in the abortion dispute adopts were derived from the reason why ending the life of a human being is wrong, then there could not be exceptions to that generalization unless some special case obtains in which there are even more powerful countervailing reasons. Such generalizations would not be merely accidental generalizations; they would point to, or be based upon, the essence of the wrongness of killing, what it is that makes killing wrong. All this suggests that a necessary condition of resolving the abortion controversy is a more theoretical account of the wrongness of killing. After all, if we merely believe, but do not understand, why killing adult human beings such as ourselves is wrong, how could we conceivably show that abortion is either immoral or permissible? II. In order to develop such an account, we can start from the following unproblematic assumption concerning our own case: it is wrong to kill us. Why is it wrong? Some answers can be easily eliminated. It might be said that what makes killing us wrong is that a killing brutalizes the one who kills. But the brutalization consists of being inured to the performance of an act that is hideously immoral; hence, the brutalization does not explain the immorality. It might be said that what makes killing us wrong is the great loss others would experience due to our absence. Although such hubris is understandable, such an explanation does not account for the wrongness of killing hermits, or those whose lives are relatively independent and whose friends find it easy to make new friends. A more obvious answer is better. What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victims friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of ones life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of ones life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted ones future. Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim. To describe this as the loss of life can be misleading, however. The change in my biological state does not by itself make killing me wrong. The effect of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future personal life. These activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments are either valuable for their own sakes or are means to something else that is valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my future are not valued by me now, but will come to be valued by 190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY me as I grow older and as my values and capacities change. When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong. This being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future. 6 How should this rudimentary theory of the wrongness of killing be evaluated? It cannot be faulted for deriving an ought from an is, for it does not. The analysis assumes that killing me (or you, reader) is prima facie seriously wrong. The point of the analysis is to establish which natural property ultimately explains the wrongness of the killing, given that it is wrong. A natural property will ultimately explain the wrongness of killing, only if (1) the explanation fits with our intuitions about the matter and (2) there is no other natural property that provides the basis for a better explanation of the wrongness of killing. This analysis rests on the intuition that what makes killing a particular human or animal wrong is what it does to that particular human or animal. What makes killing wrong is some natural effect or other of the killing. Some would deny this. For instance, a divinecommand theorist in ethics would deny it. Surely this denial is, however, one of those features of divine-command theory which renders it so implausible. The claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victims future is,directly supported by two considerations. In the first place, this theory explains why we regard killing as one of the worst of crimes. Killing is especially wrong, because it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other crime. In the second place, people with AIDS or cancer who know they are dying believe, of course, that dying is a very bad thing for them. They believe that the loss of a future to them that they would otherwise have experienced is what makes their premature death a very bad thing for them. A better theory of the wrongness of killing would require a different natural property associated with killing which better fits with the attitudes of the dying. What could it be? The view that what makes killing wrong is the loss to the victim of the value of the victims future gains additional support when some of its implications are examined. In the first place, it is incompatible h I have been most influenced on this matter byJonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (New York: Penguin, 1977), ch. 3; and Robert Young, What Is So Wrong with Killing People? Philosophy, l iv, 210 (1979):515-528. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 191 with the view that it is wrong to kill only beings who are biologically human. It is possible that there exists a different species from another planet whose members have a future like ours. Since having a future like that is what makes killing someone wrong, this theory entails that it would be wrong to kill members of such a species. Hence, this theory is opposed to the claim that only life that is biologically human has great moral worth, a claim which many antiabortionists have seemed to adopt. This opposition, which this theory has in common with personhood theories, seems to be a merit of the theory. In the second place, the claim that the loss of ones future is the wrong-making feature of ones being killed entails the possibility that the futures of some actual nonhuman mammals on our own planet are sufficiently like ours that it is seriously wrong to kill them also. Whether some animals do have the same right to life as human beings depends on adding to the account of the wrongness of killing some additional account ofjust what it is about my future or the futures of other adult human beings which makes it wrong to kill us. No such additional account will be offered in this essay. Undoubtedly, the provision of such an account would be a very difficult matter. Undoubtedly, any such account would be quite controversial. Hence, it surely should not reflect badly on this sketch of an elementary theory of the wrongness of killing that it is indeterminate with respect to some very difficult issues regarding animal rights. In the third place, the claim that the loss of ones future is the wrong-making feature of ones being killed does not entail, as sanctity of human life theories do, that active euthanasia is wrong. Persons who are severely and incurably ill, who face a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die will not have suffered a loss if they are killed. It is, strictly speaking, the value of a humans future which makes killing wrong in this theory. This being so, killing does not necessarily wrong some persons who are sick and dying. Of course, there may be other reasons for a prohibition of active euthanasia, but that is another matter. Sanctity-of-human-life theories seem to hold that active euthanasia is seriously wrong even in an individual case where there seems to be good reason for it independently of public policy considerations. This consequence is most implausible, and it is a plus for the claim that the loss of a future of value is what makes killing wrong that it does not share this consequence. In the fourth place, the account of the wrongness of killing defended in this essay does straightforwardly entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill children and infants, for we do presume that they have futures of value. Since we do believe that it is wrong to kill 192 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY defenseless little babies, it is important that a theory of the wrongness of killing easily account for this. Personhood theories of the wrongness of killing, on the other hand, cannot straightforwardly account for the wrongness of killing infants and young children. 7 Hence, such theories must add special ad hoc accounts of the wrongness of killing the young. The plausibility of such ad hoc theories seems to be a function of how desperately one wants such theories to work. The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future accounts for the wrongness of killing young children and infants directly; it makes the wrongness of such acts as obvious as we actually think it is. This is a further merit of this theory. Accordingly, it seems that this value of a future-like-ours theory of the wrongness of killing shares strengths of both sanctity-of-life and personhood accounts while avoiding weaknesses of both. In addition, it meshes with a central intuition concerning what makes killing wrong. The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong. This argument does not rely on the invalid inference that, since it is wrong to kill persons, it is wrong to kill potential persons also. The category that is morally central to this analysis is the category of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the category of personhood. The argument to the conclusion that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong proceeded independently of the notion of person or potential person or any equivalent. Someone may wish to start with this analysis in terms of the value of a human future, conclude that abortion is, except perhaps in rare circumstances, seriously morally wrong, infer that fetuses have the right to life, and then call fetuses persons as a result of their having the right to life. Clearly, in this case, the category of person is being used to state the conclusion of the analysis rather than to generate the argument of the analysis. The structure of this anti-abortion argument can be both illuminated and defended by comparing it to what appears to be the best 7 Feinberg, Tooley, Warren, and Engelhardt have all dealt with this problem. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL. 193 argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals. This latter argument is based on the assumption that it is prima facie wrong to inflict pain on me (or you, reader). What is the natural property associated with the infliction of pain which makes such infliction wrong? The obvious answer seems to be that the infliction of pain causes suffering and that suffering is a misfortune. The suffering caused by the infliction of pain is what makes the wanton infliction of pain on me wrong. The wanton infliction of pain on other adult humans causes suffering. The wanton infliction of pain on animals causes suffering. Since causing suffering is what makes the wanton infliction of pain wrong and since the wanton infliction of pain on animals causes suffering, it follows that the wanton infliction of pain on animals is wrong. This argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals shares a number of structural features with the argument for the serious prima facie wrongness of abortion. Both arguments start with an obvious assumption concerning what it is wrong to do to me (or you, reader). Both then look for the characteristic or the consequence of the wrong action which makes the action wrong. Both recognize that the wrong-making feature of these immoral actions is a property of actions sometimes directed at individuals other than postnatal human beings. If the structure of the argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals is sound, then the structure of the argument for the prima facie serious wrongness of abortion is also sound, for the structure of the two arguments is the same. The structure common to both is the key to the explanation of how the wrongness of abortion can be demonstrated without recourse to the category of person. In neither argument is that category crucial. This defense of an argument for the wrongness of abortion in terms of a structurally similar argument for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals succeeds only if the account regarding animals is the correct account. Is it? In the first place, it seems plausible. In the second place, its major competition is Kants account. Kant believed that we do not have direct duties to animals at all, because they are not persons. Hence, Kant had to explain and justify the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals on the grounds that he who is hard in his dealings with animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men. 8 The problem with Kants account is that 8 Duties to Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infeld, trans. (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 239. 194 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY there seems to be no reason for accepting this latter claim unless Kants account is rejected. If the alternative to Kants account is accepted, then it is easy to understand why someone w ho is indifferent to inflicting pain on animals is also indifferent to inflicting pain on humans, for one is indifferent to what makes inflicting pain wrong in both cases. But, if Kants account is accepted, there is no intelligible reason why one who is hard in his dealings with animals (or crabgrass or stones) should also be hard in his dealings with men. After all, men are persons: animals are no more persons than crabgrass or stones. Persons are Kants crucial moral category. Why, in short, should a Kantian accept the basic claim in Kants argument? Hence, Kants argument for the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals rests on a claim that, in a world of Kantian moral agents, is demonstrably false. Therefore, the alternative analysis, being more plausible anyway, should be accepted. Since this alternative analysis has the same structure as the anti-abortion argument being defended here, we have further support for the argument for the immorality of abortion being defended in this essay. Of course, this value of a future-like-ours argument, if sound, shows only that abortion is prima facie wrong, not that it is wrong in any and all circumstances. Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus, if killed, is, however, at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard adult human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons. The loss of ones life is almost the greatest misfortune that can happen to one. Presumably abortion could be justified in some circumstances, only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be at least as great. Accordingly, morally permissible abortions will be rare indeed unless, perhaps, they occur so early in pregnancy that a fetus is not yet definitely an individual. Hence, this argument should be taken as showing that abortion is presumptively very seriously wrong, where the presumption is very strong-as strong as the presumption that killing another adult human being is wrong. III. How complete an account of the wrongness of killing does the value of a future-like-ours account have to be in order that the wrongness of abortion is a consequence? This account does not have to be an account of the necessary conditions for the wrongness of killing. Some persons in nursing homes may lack valuable human futures, yet it may be wrong to kill them for other reasons. Furthermore, this account does not obviously have to be the sole reason killing is wrong where the victim did have a valuable future. This analysis claims only WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 195 that, for any killing where the victim did have a valuable future like ours, having that future by itself is sufficient to create the strong presumption that the killing is seriously wrong. One way to overturn the value of a future-like-ours argument would be to find some account of the wrongness of killing which is at least as intelligible and which has different implications for the ethics of abortion. Two rival accounts possess at least some degree of plausibility. One account is based on the obvious fact that eople value the experience of living and wish for that valuable experience to continue. Therefore, it might be said, what makes killing wrong is the discontinuation of that experience for the victim. Let us call this the discontinuation account. ~ Another rival account is based upon the obvious fact that people strongly desire to continue to live. This suggests that what makes killing us so wrong is that it interferes with the fulfillment of a str ong and fundamental desire, the fulfillment of which is necessary for the fulfillment of any other desires we might have. Let us call this the desire account. I'( Consider first the desire account as a rival account of the ethics of killing which would provide the basis for rejecting the anti-abortion position. Such an account will have to be stronger than the value of a future-like-ours account of the wrongness of abortion if it is to do the job expected of it. To entail the wrongness of abortion, the value of a future-like-ours account has only to provide a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the wrongness of killing. The desire account, on the other hand, must provide us also with a necessary condition for the wrongness of killing in order to generate a prochoice conclusion on abortion. The reason for this is that presumably the argument from the desire account moves from the claim that what makes killing wrong is interference with a very strong desire to the claim that abortion is not wrong because the fetus lacks a strong desire to live. Obviously, this inference fails if someones having the desire to live is not a necessary condition of its being wrong to kill that individual. One problem with the desire account is that we do regard it as seriously wrong to kill persons who have little desire to live or who have no desire to live or, indeed, have a desire not to live. We believe it is seriously wrong to kill the unconscious, the sleeping, those who 9 I am indebted to Jack Bricke for raising this objection. Presumably a preference utilitarian would press such an objection. Tooley once suggested that his account has such a theoretical underpinning. See his Abortion and Infanticide, pp. 44/5. re tired of life, and those who are suicidal. The value-of-a-humanfuture account renders standard morality intelligible in these cases; these cases appear to be incompatible with the desire account. The desire account is subject to a deeper difficulty. We desire life, because we value the goods of this life. The goodness of life is not secondary to our desire for it. If this were not so, the pain of ones own premature death could be done away with merely by an appropria te alteration in the configuration of ones desires. This is absurd. Hence, it would seem that it is the loss of the goods of ones future, not the interference with the fulfillment of a strong desire to live, which accounts ultimately for the wrongness of killing. It is worth noting that, if the desire account is modified so that it does not provide a necessary, but only a sufficient, condition for the wrongness of killing, the desire account is compatible with the value of a future-like-ours account. The combined accounts will yield an anti-abortion ethic. This suggests that one can retain what is intuitively plausible about the desire account without a challenge to the basic argument of this paper. It is also worth noting that, if future desires have moral force in a modified desire account of the wrongness of killing, one can find support for an anti-abortion ethic even in the absence of a value of a future-like-ours account. If one decides that a morally relevant property, the possession of which is sufficient to make it wrong to kill some individual, is the desire at some future time to live-one might decide to justify ones refusal to kill suicidal teenagers on these grounds, for example-then, since typical fetuses will have the desire in the future to live, it is wrong to kill typical fetuses. Accordingly, it does not seem that a desire account of the wrongness of killing can provide a justification of a pro-choice ethic of abortion which is nearly as adequate as the value of a human-future justification of an anti-abortion ethic. The discontinuation account looks more promising as an account of the wrongness of killing. It seems just as intelligible as the value of a future-like-ours account, but it does not justify an anti-abortion position. Obviously, if it is the continuation of ones activities, experiences, and projects, the loss of which makes killing wrong, then it is not wrong to kill fetuses for that reason, for fetuses do not have experiences, activities, and projects to be continued or discontinued. Accordingly, the discontinuation account does not have the antiabortion consequences that the value of a future-like-ours account has. Yet, it seems as intelligible as the value of a future-like-ours account, for when we think of what would be wrong with our being WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL, 197 illed, it does seem as if it is the discontinuation of what makes our lives worthwhile which makes killing us wrong. Is the discontinuation account just as good an account as the value of a future-like-ours account? The discontinuation account will not be adequate at all, if it does not refer to the value of the experience that may be discontinued. One does not want the discontinuation account to make it wrong to kill a patient who begs for death and who is in severe pain that cannot be relieved short of killing. (I leave open the question of whether it is wrong for other reasons. Accordingly, the discontinuation account must be more than a bare discontinuation account. It must make some reference to the positive value of the patients experiences. But, by the same token, the value of a future-like-ours account cannot be a bare future account either. Just having a future surely does not itself rule out killing the above patient. This account must make some reference to the value of the patients future experiences and projects also. Hence, both accounts involve the value of experiences, projects, and activities. So far we still have symmetry between the accounts. The symmetry fades, however, when we focus on the time period of the value of the experiences, etc. , which has moral consequences. Although both accounts leave open the possibility that the patient in our example may be killed, this possibility is left open only in virtue of the utterly bleak future for the patient. It makes no difference whether the patients immediate past contains intolerable pain, or consists in being in a coma (which we can imagine is a situation of indifference), or consists in a life of value. If the patients future is a future of value, we want our account to make it wrong to kill the patient. If the patients future is intolerable, whatever his or her immediate past, we want our account to allow killing the patient. Obviously, then, it is the value of that patients future which is doing the work in rendering the morality of killing the patient intelligible. This being the case, it seems clear that whether one has immediate past experiences or not does no work in the explanation of what makes killing wrong. The addition the discontinuation account makes to the value of a human future account is otiose. Its addition to the value-of-a-future account plays no role at all in rendering intelligible the wrongness of killing. Therefore, it can be discarded with the discontinuation account of which it is a part. IV. The analysis of the previous section suggests that alternative general accounts of the wrongness of killing are either inadequate or unsuccessful in getting around the anti-abortion consequences of the value 198 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY of a future-like-ours argument. A different strategy for avoiding these anti-abortion consequences involves limiting the scope of the value of a future argument. More precisely, the strategy involves arguing that fetuses lack a property that is essential for the value-ofa-future argument (or for any anti-abortion argument) to apply to them. One move of this sort is based upon the claim that a necessary condition of ones future being valuable is that one values it. Value implies a valuer. Given this one might argue that, since fetuses cannot value their futures, their futures are not valuable to them. Hence, it does not seriously wrong them deliberately to end their lives. This move fails, however, because of some ambiguities. Let us assume that something cannot be of value unless it is valued by someone. This does not entail that my life is of no value unless it is valued by me. I may think, in a period of despair, that my future is of no worth whatsoever, but I may be wrong because others rightly see value-even great value-in it. Furthermore, my future can be valuable to me even if I do not value it. This is the case when a young person attempts suicide, but is rescued and goes on to significant human achievements. Such young peoples futures are ultimately valuable to them, even though such futures do not seem to be valuable to them at the moment of attempted suicide. A fetuss future can be valuable to it in the same way. Accordingly, this attempt to limit the anti-abortion argument fails. Another similar attempt to reject the anti-abortion position is based on Tooleys claim that an entity cannot possess the right to life unless it has the capacity to desire its continued existence. It follows that, since fetuses lack the conceptual capacity to desire to continue to live, they lack the right to life. Accordingly, Tooley concludes that abortion cannot be seriously prima facie wrong (op. cit. , pp. 46/7). What could be the evidence for Tooleys basic claim? Tooley once argued that individuals have a prima facie right to what they desire and that the lack of the capacity to desire something undercuts the basis of ones right to it (op. cit. , pp. 44/5). This argument plainly will not succeed in the context of the analysis of this essay, however, since the point here is to establish the fetuss right to life on other grounds. Tooleys argument assumes that the right to life cannot be established in general on some basis other than the desire for life. This position was considered and rejected in the preceding section of this paper. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORA, 199 One might attempt to defend Tooleys basic claim on the grounds that, because a fetus cannot apprehend continued life as a benefit, its continued life cannot be a benefit or cannot be something it has a right to or cannot be something that is in its interest. This might be defended in terms of the general proposition that, if an individual is literally incapable of caring about or taking an interest in some X, then one does not have a right to X or X is not a benefit or X is not something that is in ones interest. Each member of this family of claims seems to be open to objections. As John C. Stevens2 has pointed out, one may have a right to be treated with a certain medical procedure (because of a health insurance policy one has purchased), even though one cannot conceive of the nature of the procedure. And, as Tooley himself has pointed out, persons who have been indoctrinated, or drugged, or rendered temporarily unconscious may be literally incapable of caring about or taking an interest in something that is in their interest or is something to which they have a right, or is something that benefits them. Hence, the Tooley claim that would restrict the scope of the value of a future-like-ours argument is undermined by counterexamples. 3 Finally, Paul Bassen4has argued that, even though the prospects of an embryo might seem to be a basis for the wrongness of abortion, an embryo cannot be a victim and therefore cannot be wronged. An embryo cannot be a victim, he says, because it lacks sentience. His central argument for this seems to be that, even though plants and the permanently unconscious are alive, they clearly cannot be victims. What is the explanation of this? Bassen claims that the explanation is that their lives consist of mere metabolism and mere metabolism is not enough to ground victimizability. Mentation is required. The problem with this attempt to establish the absence of victimizability is that both plants and the permanently unconscious clearly lack what Bassen calls prospects or what I have called a future life like ours. Hence, it is surely open to one to argue that the real reason we believe plants and the permanently unconscious cannot be Donald VanDeVeer seems to think this is self-evident. See his Whither Baby Doe? in Matters of Life and Death, p. 233. 12Must the Bearer of a Right Have the Concept of That to Which He Has a Right? Ethics, xcv, 1 (1984):68-74. `See Tooley again in Abor tion and Infanticide, pp. 47-49. Present Sakes and Future Prospects: The Status of Early Abortion, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xi, 4 (1982):322-326. 200 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY victims is that killing them cannot deprive them of a future life like ours; the real reason is not their absence of present meritation. Bassen recognizes that his view is subject to this difficulty, and he recognizes that the case of children seems to support this difficulty, for much of what we do for children is based on prospects. He argues, however, that, in the case of children and in other such cases, potentiality comes into play only where victimizability has been secured on other grounds (ibid. , p. 333). Bassens defense of his view is patently question-begging, since what is adequate to secure victimizability is exactly what is at issue. His examples do not support his own view against the thesis of this essay. Of course, embryos can be victims: when their lives are deliberately terminated, they are deprived of their futures of value, their prospects. This makes them victims, for it directly wrongs them. The seeming plausibility of Bassens view stems from the fact that paradigmatic cases of imagining someone as a victim involve empathy, and empathy requires mentation of the victim. The victims of flood, famine, rape, or child abuse are all persons with whom we can empathize. That empathy seems to be part of seeing them as victims. In spite of the strength of these examples, the attractive intuition that a situation in which there is victimization requires the possibility of empathy is subject to counterexamples. Consider a case that Bassen himself offers: Posthumous obliteration of an authors work constitutes a misfortune for him only if he had wished his work to endure (op cit. , p. 318). The conditions Bassen wishes to impose upon the possibility of being victimized here seem far too strong. Perhaps this author, due to his unrealistic standards of excellence and his low self-esteem, regarded his work as unworthy of survival, even though it possessed genuine literary merit. Destruction of such work would surely victimize its author. In such a case, empathy with the victim concerning the loss is clearly impossible. Of course, Bassen does not make the possibility of empathy a necessary condition of victimizability; he requires only mentation. Hence, on Bassens actual view, this author, as I have described him, can be a victim. The problem is that the basic intuition that renders Bassens view plausible is missing in the authors case. In order to attempt to avoid counterexamples, Bassen has made his thesis too weak to be supported by the intuitions that suggested it. I Note carefully the reasons he gives on the bottom of p. 316. WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL 201 Even so, the mentation requirement on victimizability is still subject to counterexamples. Suppose a severe accident renders me totally unconscious for a month, after which I recover. Surely killing me while I am unconscious victimizes me, even though I am incapable of mentation during that time. It follows that Bassens thesis fails. Apparently, attempts to restrict the value of a future-like-ours argument so that fetuses do not fall within its scope do not succeed. V. In this essay, it has been argued that the correct ethic of the wrongness of killing can be extended to fetal life and used to show that there is a strong presumption that any abortion is morally impermissible. If the ethic of killing adopted here entails, however, that contraception is also seriously immoral, then there would appear to be a difficulty with the analysis of this essay. But this analysis does not entail that contraception is wrong. Of course, contraception prevents the actualization of a possible future of value. Hence, it follows from the claim that futures of value should be maximized that contraception is prima facie immoral. This obligation to maximize does not exist, however; furthermore, nothing in the ethics of killing in this paper entails that it does. The ethics of killing in this essay would entail that contraception is wrong only if something were denied a human future of value by contraception. Nothing at all is denied such a future by contraception, however. Candidates for a subject of harm by contraception fall into four categories: (1) some sperm or other, (2) some ovum or other, (3) a sperm and an ovum separately, and (4) a sperm and an ovum together. Assigning the harm to some sperm is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making a sperm the subject of harm rather than an ovum. Assigning the harm to some ovum is utterly arbitrary, for no reason can be given for making an ovum the subject of harm rather than a sperm. One might attempt to avoid these problems by insisting that contraception deprives both the sperm and the ovum separately of a valuable future like ours. On this alternative, too many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed to be wrong, because it deprived us of one future of value, not two. One might attempt to avoid this problem by holding that contraception deprives the combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable future like ours. But here the definite article misleads. At the time of contraception, there are hundreds of millions of sperm, one (released) ovum and millions of possible combinations of all of these. There is no actual combination at all. Is the subject of the loss to be a merely possible 202 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY combination? Which one? This alternative does not yield an actual subject of harm either. Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception. VI. The purpose of this essay has been to set out an argument for the serious presumptive wrongness of abortion subject to the assumption that the moral permissibility of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus. Since a fetus possesses a property, the possession of which in adult human beings is sufficient to make killing an adult human being wrong, abortion is wrong. This way of dealing with the problem of abortion seems superior to other approaches to the ethics of abortion, because it rests on an ethics of killing which is close to self-evident, because the crucial morally relevant property clearly applies to fetuses, and because the argument avoids the usual equivocations on human life, human being, or person. The argument rests neither on religious claims nor on Papal dogma. It is not subject to the objection of speciesism. Its soundness is compatible with the moral permissibility of euthanasia and contraception. It deals with our intuitions concerning young children. Finally, this analysis can be viewed as resolving a standard probthe standard problem-concerning the ethics of lem-indeed, abortion. Clearly, it is wrong to kill adult human beings. Clearly, it is not wrong to end the life of some arbitrarily chosen single human cell. Fetuses seem to be like arbitrarily chosen human cells in some respects and like adult humans in other respects. The problem of the ethics of abortion is the problem of determining the fetal property that settles this moral controversy. The thesis of this essay is that the problem of the ethics of abortion, so understood, is solvable. DON MARQUIS University of Kansas